Economic globalization causes an increasing international fragmentation (disintegration) of value-added chains, whereby firms outsource components of production to foreign markets. There is a high level of concern about unwelcome distributional effects. This paper provides a theoretical treatment of this issue within a general Heckscher-Ohlin framework, allowing for an arbitrary number of goods, factors, and fragments. It shows how a fragmented production equilibrium is disturbed by lower costs of fragmentation, and it introduces the concept of effective prices of fragments to derive general results that characterize the distributional consequences of an increase in international fragmentation occurring simultaneously in several industries.
INTRODUCTION
Industrial production is a multi-stage process. Some stages are carried out in an integrated way within firms, while others are outsourced to the market. In a market economy, the borderline between vertical integration and outsourcing is determined by profit-maximizing firms who weigh the costs and benefits of governing production in an integrated, as opposed to disintegrated, way. This borderline is subject to change if the conditions that determine these costs and benefits change. Such developments are most likely to meet the public eye, and cause policy concern, if domestic firms are outsourcing parts of their value-added chain to foreign economies, and if the driving force is lower cost due to factor price differences, say cheaper foreign labor. We have seen several prominent examples of this happening in recent times, and a large body of systematic empirical research has documented that international outsourcing is, indeed, a significant feature of the present wave of economic globalization. Production in several industries is characterized by an increasing degree of international disintegration, or fragmentation. 1 From a theoretical perspective, international fragmentation involves two distinct challenges. 2 One is to explain why in some cases production relies on intra-firm hierarchies, while in others it relies on market transactions. The relevant decision problem has two dimensions: one is whether to disintegrate at all, and the other is whether or not to do so across national borders. Thus, Grossman and Helpman (2002a) develop a general equilibrium model focusing on the costs and benefits of outsourcing in a closed economy environment, while in Grossman and Helpman (2002b) outsourcing as such is an exogenous necessity and the question is whether it happens across national borders. 3 The second challenge is to explore the general equilibrium consequences of a rise in international fragmentation. As noted by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001a) , one might generally expect that international fragmentation increases the scope for gains from trade. 4 But we know that such gains rarely come without pain, particularly in the form of unwelcome distributional effects. Thus, starting with Krugman (1995) , outsourcing has also been debated as a possible culprit in connection with the concern that has meanwhile arisen about the distributional consequences of economic globalization.
This paper takes up the second challenge, intending to enhance our understanding of how international fragmentation affects factor prices and, thus, income distribution. Previous analyses focusing on this issue have produced a vast array of different results that sometimes seem contradictory and are difficult to understand as manifestations of a single principle. In their seminal papers, Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) argue that outsourcing in connection with US foreign direct investment in Mexican Maquiladoras may explain why wages for unskilled labor have declined relative to skilled labor in both countries, while at the same time production has become more skill-intensive. In contrast, Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1999 argues that under certain conditions US labor will gain from Maquiladora-type outsourcing to 1. An early characterization of this change can be found in Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) who have pointed out that technological advances in certain types of services that are required to link different stages of production are an important driving element. For similar, more recent accounts, see Harris (1995 Harris ( , 2001 and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a) . For empirical studies, see Irwin (1996) , Feenstra (1998) , Hummels et al. (1998 Hummels et al. ( , 2001 , and several papers in Arndt and Kierzkowski (2001) . 2. Throughout this paper, I use the terms international outsourcing, international fragmentation, and international disintegration synonymously. 3. See also McLaren (2000) . At any point in time, the relevant conditions may change in such a way that there is a tendency of increasing integration on the firm level, with a simultaneous tendency of international disintegration. The result then is an emergence of vertical multinational firms, as for instance described in Markusen (2001 Markusen ( , 2002 . 4. See also a related recent paper by Samuelson (2001). Mexico. 5 Venables (1999) demonstrates that even in a single two-sector model several different outcomes may arise, including 'some curious cases'. Using a somewhat more general framework, Jones and Kierzkowski (2001a, 2001b ) discuss a host of different outcomes -'some rather surprising' -where fragmentation may be beneficial or harmful to low-skilled workers in relation to skilled workers or capital, depending on a complex interplay between the factor endowment position and output pattern of a country on the one hand, and the details of the fragmented activities on the other. The richness of possible results also extends to the question of international factor price equalization. Thus, Deardorff (2001a) shows that fragmentation increases the likelihood of international factor price equalization in that it renders factor price equalization an equilibrium outcome for certain factor endowments which would otherwise rule this out. However, as shown in Deardorff (2001b) , individual instances of fragmentation may well increase international factor price differences.
This brief review reveals that the present state of knowledge largely relies on casuistic discussions. What we are still missing is a concise formulation of a general principle which is at force in each special case. This paper suggests a general equilibrium framework which allows us to formulate such a principle. The framework is one where trade is determined by a co-existence of Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin-type comparative advantage, allowing for an arbitrary number of goods and factors, and where factor price differences are the driving force of fragmentation. According to conventional theory of comparative advantage, a production process is carried out under a single set of factor prices, domestic or foreign. The distinctive feature of international, as opposed to domestic, outsourcing is that it allows production of a single good, or a single value-added process, to draw on different factor markets with differing factor prices. Domestic outsourcing is, almost by definition, outsourcing to a market with the same factor prices. In contrast, international outsourcing responds to factor price differences in trying to achieve cost savings through a suitable match between the production characteristics of individual fragments of value-added and the pattern of factor prices prevailing in different countries.
A first contribution of this paper in Section 2 is to describe a trading equilibrium where international factor price differences constitute potential incentives for international fragmentation. Specifically, it derives a 'margin' of international fragmentation which separates fragments, or components, of production that are outsourced to the foreign economy from those produced domestically. 6 Section 3 then looks more closely at the disturbance of the 5. In Kohler (2001) , I have shown that this difference is best understood in terms of the difference between factor-biased and sector-biased technological change, in connection with the question of whether technological change happens in a closed or in an open economy; see also Krugman (1995) . 6. Throughout the analysis, I use the terms fragment and component synonymously.
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r Verein für Socialpolitik and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003 zero profit condition for a certain industry, if some globalization scenario displaces its margin of fragmentation. It determines the magnitude of this disturbance and identifies the conditions under which it operates like a Stolper-Samuelson-type 'shock' to the industry. This is a key step of the analysis, as it allows us to draw on familiar logic in order to determine the factor price effects of multiple instances of international fragmentation in a general equilibrium setting. Following this logic, Section 4 first shows that under fairly general conditions at least one factor faces a real income loss from fragmentation, even though the economy at large gains. The final step then introduces a measure for distributional consequences from outsourcing and derives a general theorem which relates these consequences to key characteristics of the underlying pattern of fragmentation. Two corollaries reconstruct seemingly contradictory results of the previous literature as special cases of this theorem. Section 5 concludes the paper with suggestions for further research.
WHY PRODUCTION BECOMES FRAGMENTED
Suppose that, to start with, some final good is entirely produced in a given country. International fragmentation is then defined as a course of events whereby pieces of this production process are successively broken off, to be carried out in a different country, and then channeled back into the production process towards the final good. 7 In this context, a country simply means a unique vector of factor prices, determined by given factor endowments and given world market prices for final goods. Intuitively, the relationship between final goods prices and national factor prices must depend on the extent to which production is fragmented. In order to analyze fragmentation, we need to specify the exact way in which pieces that may be broken off (i.e. the fragments) rely on inputs of primary factors. That is, we must first introduce a 'technology of fragmentation'. Almost by definition, prior to fragmentation there are no prices for individual fragments because they are not traded. Market prices will emerge only once fragmentation takes place, and if it relies on arm's-length transactions. In addition to specifying a technology of fragmentation, a satisfactory theory of fragmentation thus needs to focus on international differences in factor prices as a driving force of fragmentation, rather than differences in prices of fragments themselves (thereby assuming that they are traded to start with).
This section sets the stage of analysis by specifying a technology that permits international fragmentation, first describing an equilibrium featuring international differences in factor prices, but assuming complete vertical integration of production within countries. We then explore whether such 7. The Oxford Universal Dictionary describes a fragment as 'a piece broken off; a (comparatively) small portion of anything'.
international factor price differences constitute incentives to actually carry out international fragmentation. Equilibrium requires that all cost savings from fragmentation have been exploited. We show that this gives rise to a margin of fragmentation, formally a hyperplane in factor space, which separates domestic fragments from those that are more cheaply produced under foreign factor prices.
Technology of fragmentation
Suppose there are I traded goods, produced with M primary factors according to a constant returns-to-scale technology. Assuming that there is perfect competition on domestic factor markets, we describe the technology by means of concave unit-cost functions c i (w), where w is a vector of domestic factor prices. Fragmentation implies some form of separability in production functions, which must be reflected in the unit-cost functions. We therefore stipulate that the unit-cost function for good i (i 5 1,y, I ) may be written as
We thus assume a given number of fragments (components) which are equal to F for all goods ( f 5 1,y, F ). 8 Moreover, all the fragments are essential. Each component has an associated minimum unit-cost function c f i ðwÞ. Notice that this is quite a strong form of separability, implying that the unit factor demands for each fragment depend only on factor prices at its location of production, and are independent on how, and where, other fragments are produced.
Using rc i (w) to denote the gradient of the unit-cost function, the vector of cost-minimizing input requirements per unit value of final output produced is
where p i is the price of final good i which we assume to be given and constant throughout the analysis. Thus, a f i ðwÞ denotes the cost-minimizing input bundle used in fragment f of the value-added chain per unit value of the final good i.
Equations (1) and (2) relate to the domestic economy. The foreign economy has the same technology, except for Ricardian differences in 8. Throughout the analysis, I use the terms fragment and component synonymously. productivity. Both countries face the same commodity prices, but they have different factor prices, due to factor endowment differences and/or trade barriers. We need not model this in detail. If w Ã denotes foreign factor prices, the cost-minimizing input requirements per unit value of final outputs produced abroad are:
and
If t i 41, then the foreign country has a Ricardian disadvantage in industry i, and vice versa. I assume that such differences are industry-specific, but not specific to individual fragments. t i characterizes pure efficiency differences that are relevant also for a non-fragmentation equilibrium. Disintegration of production will usually be costly, as it is more difficult to link fragments across international borders than to do so within a national firm. 9 While such costs can be modeled by complete analogy to t i , it is nevertheless important to make a conceptual distinction between efficiency gaps and costs of fragmentation, because the former are relevant quite irrespective of international fragmentation, and because globalization scenarios typically involve reductions only in the latter. When dealing with such scenarios below, we will capture the cost of international fragmentation (for instance, due to communication, transport or rules of origin) by a parameter g i which is analogous to t i . Note that a i (w) and a f i ðwÞ are cost-minimal inputs assuming that all production takes place under a single set of factor prices w, and similarly for a Ã i ðw Ã Þ and a f Ã i ðw Ã Þ with factor prices w Ã . In contrast, with international fragmentation part of production takes place under factor prices w, while the rest takes place with prices w Ã . Writingã a 
Equilibrium with integrated production
If all production is integrated within each country, a zero-profit equilibrium satisfies the following two sets of inequalities:
9. See Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001a) who emphasize that such costs are a crucial element behind the recent upsurge of outsourcing. and 1 w ÃT a Ã i ðw Ã Þ w ÃT ½a i ðwÞt i ð 6Þ
In both expressions, the first inequality simply states that the minimum cost of producing a unit value of output must not be less than 1 in either country, given its factor prices. For goods produced domestically, equality must obtain. The second inequality follows from cost minimization. a Ã i ðw Ã Þ is what costminimizing foreign firms would do to generate a unit value of output, when faced with factor prices w Ã . Given the assumed Hicks-neutral difference in technology, the bundle a Ã i ðw Ã Þ=t i is a feasible way for domestic firms to generate a unit value of output. Cost minimization therefore implies the second inequality in (5). The interpretation of (6) is analogous.
For each country there are I zero-profit conditions corresponding to the first inequalities in (5) and (6). These, together with M full-employment conditions, determine I output levels and M factor prices for each country. If MoI, there will typically be zero outputs for some goods in either country, depending on factor endowments. At this stage we make no special assumption about the pattern of specialization, and we shall turn to the full-employment condition only in Section 4 where they become important. If there is a subset of goods S produced domestically but not produced abroad, and a subset S Ã produced only by the foreign economy, then we must have: 10 ðw À w Ã t i Þ T a j ðwÞo0 i 2 S ð7Þ and ðw Ã À w=t i Þ T a Ã j ðw Ã Þo0 i 2 S Ã ð8Þ Figure 1 illustrates an equilibrium for two factors, K and L, and four goods. The line labeled w Ã t 2 connects factor bundles satisfying t 2 w Ã K K þ w Ã L L À Á ¼ 1, while the line w depicts (w K K1w L L) 5 1. By construction, t 2 41, i.e. the foreign economy has a Ricardian disadvantage in good 2. The position of line w Ã t 2 , relative to w, captures this disadvantage, and since the line is entirely below the unit-value isoquant for good 2 (labeled 1/p 2 ), while w is tangent to the isoquant, good 2 is only produced domestically. Analogous interpretations hold for all four goods, whereby good 1 is not produced domestically, while goods 2 and 3 are not produced abroad and good 4 is produced in common. To avoid clutter, only factor bundles a 2 (w) and a Ã 4 ðw Ã Þ are depicted. Notice that, because of the Ricardian difference in technology, this pattern does not uniquely reflect the factor intensity ordering. 11 For the same 10. All of these goods are, of course, also produced in the rest-of-the-world economy which we need not look at for our purpose. 11. Technological differences here act much like tariffs on intermediates in Deardorff (1979) .
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Equilibrium with fragmentation
As long as production is integrated within firms, individual fragments of the value-added process do not carry market prices. However, one may impute a value to any one fragment, equal to the market price of the final good less the cost incurred for all other components, as required per unit value of the final good. In reference to the effective protection literature we may call this the 'effective price' of a fragment. More specifically, effective prices of fragments are defined as follows. 12
Definition 1 (effective price). For a zero-profit equilibrium where all production is integrated domestically, the effective price of any fragment f in Figure 1 Pre-fragmentation trading equilibrium 12. There is a close analogy between this definition and the theory of effective protection; see Ethier (1977) .
industry i is defined as:
In the more general case where some fragment g is produced abroad, the term w T a g i ðwÞ is replaced by the corresponding foreign factor cost w ÃTã a production equilibrium:
These are simply scaled-up versions of the factor bundlesã a f i ðwÞ, each representing a value of 1, given effective prices p f i . By complete analogy, we define
which is the unit-value level of foreign production of fragment f, assuming that it, together with all other components, feeds into domestic assembly of the final good i; hence the use of the domestic effective price on the righthand side of (12). The above definitions (11) and (12) refer to the costminimizing factor bundles used per unit of a fragment,ã a f i ðwÞ andã a f Ã i ðw Ã Þ. Dividing these by the effective prices per unit of a fragment gives the input bundle representing a unit value of that fragment. 16 Notice, once again, our scaling of units is such that all q f i ðw; w Ã Þ ¼ 1. An equilibrium with international fragmentation requires that the domestic zero-profit condition (10) is satisfied. Given the above definition (11), this implies
for all i and f. This states that the domestic minimum cost of a unit-value level of any fragment cannot be less than one, and it must be equal to one if this fragment is produced domestically. Invoking revealed cost-minimization we have
This is similar to, yet also different from, condition (5) above. As expected, the possibility to disintegrate production makes a difference. Figure 2 illustrates this by isolating good 3 from the earlier figure. Barring international fragmentation, the case depicted would be an equilibrium, where integrated production of good 3 is viable (non-viable) domestically (abroad). Formally, for i 5 3 condition (7) is satisfied (isoquant 1/p 3 tangent to line w), while (8) is not (isoquant 1/p 3 above factor-price line w Ã t 3 ). But if disintegration becomes possible, this is no longer an equilibrium. More specifically, integrated production, while satisfying condition (14), violates for f 5 1 and i 5 3. This is analogous to (6) and states that in equilibrium foreign production of fragment f with domestic assembly of the final good must not yield a positive profit. In Figure 3 , violation of this condition is easily recognized by the fact that the unit-value isoquant for activity b 1 3 (as defined by (11) above and labeled 1=p 1 3 ) is below the factor-price line w Ã t 3 .
The margin of fragmentation
If we look at fragmentation from a cost-savings perspective, then violation of condition (15) simply means that domestic firms can reduce the cost of generating a unit value below 1 by outsourcing fragment f to foreign production. In Figure 2 , the aforementioned violation of (15) for fragment 1 of good 3 obtains only if international fragmentation is costless. The specific form in which costs of fragmentation arise plays an important role in various circumstances; see Harris (2001) and Kohler (2001) . For the present purpose, we employ a simple iceberg-type specification. Thus, if home firms produce fragment f of good i in the foreign country and then combine it with the remaining domestic chain of value-added, they incur cost in the ad valorem amount of g i À 140. 17 As with the Ricardian technology gaps, I assume that these costs are uniform across fragments within an industry. Generally, one expects that international factor price differences, in addition to productivity differences and the cost of fragmentation, determine the equilibrium extent of fragmentation. This is substantiated in precise terms by the following theorem:
Theorem 1 (margin of fragmentation). In an equilibrium where production may be disintegrated, (w À g i t i w Ã ) T a 5 0 defines a hyperplane in factor space which represents a margin of fragmentation for industry i in the following sense:
(1) Any fragment g with an input bundle b gÃ i ðw Ã Þ that satisfies ðw À g i t i w Ã Þ T b gÃ i ðw Ã Þo0 is an integral part of the domestic value-added chain. Figure 3 Industry gain from outsourcing 17. g i may also represent formal trade barriers like tariffs, but we shall henceforth assume that it represents real trading costs. Formal barriers may play an important role, especially where preferential trading arrangements apply. In such cases, international disintegration will typically be hampered by the need to comply with rules of origin.
(2) For any fragment h which is disintegrated from the domestic value-added chain, the factor input bundle b h i ðwÞ must satisfy ðw À g i t i w Ã Þ T b h i ðwÞ40. Notice that a separate hyperplane exists for each industry. The proof runs as follows. Equilibrium requires that domestic firms cannot further reduce unit cost by changing the location where fragments are produced. Per unit of fragment f, the savings from outsourcing may be written as:
Suppose some fragment h is produced domestically, while s h i 40. This would imply that firms forgo cost savings even at unchanged levels of fragments q h i ¼ 1. If technology allows for substitution between fragments, these savings could even be increased by employing more of fragment h once produced at lower cost abroad. Conversely, suppose that s g i o0 and fragment g were outsourced. Then, by analogous reasoning, firms would forgo cost savings by relocating production of fragment g to the home economy. Cost minimization implies that for all fragments f:
Inequality (18) (11) and (12) above, this implies statements 1 and 2, respectively, of Theorem 1. Figure 2 illustrates the theorem. If disintegration is possible only at a cost, then g 3 41 and the relevant hyperplane is A, a ray from the origin through the intersection point of the factor price lines w and g 3 t 3 w Ã . Production remains integrated domestically, because all factor bundles b f 3 ðw; w Ã Þ lie to the right of this ray. If globalization reduces costs such that g 3 5 1, then the hyperplane rotates to B and the non-fragmentation equilibrium is disturbed since it gives rise to an outsourcing incentive. Obviously, for fragmentation to become an issue the individual components of value-added must exhibit different factor intensities. These define a cone which is separated by the hyperplane of Theorem 1. If this cone has zero measure, then no such separation can arise in that industry.
The basic structure of an equilibrium with fragmentation is quite similar to the one without. The possibility of fragmentation increases the dimensionality of output space to I Â F, instead of I as in the integrated equilibrium. I Â F inequalities of the form (13) and (15) (instead of (5) and (6)), together with appropriate full employment conditions determine equilibrium levels of I Â F fragments, as well as M factor prices, in the domestic and the foreign economy. From the above analysis it is clear that this equilibrium will in general have different factor prices from the one where fragmentation is ruled out. The subsequent analysis will explore this in more detail. Under certain separability assumptions to be identified below, we may invoke the above margin of fragmentation and interpret the domestic fragments of an industry as a composite activity. In this case the output space is again reduced to I dimensions, and the structure of the equilibrium may be viewed as in the integrated case, but with the composite non-fragmented activities replacing final goods outputs.
GLOBALIZATION SHIFTS THE MARGIN OF FRAGMENTATION
Having characterized an equilibrium with margins of fragmentation, we now assume that globalization reduces g i for a certain industry. This implies a shift in the margin of fragmentation which may disturb the equilibrium for industry i. In this section, we determine the magnitude of this disturbance and then characterize possible ways in which an equilibrium may be restored through further international fragmentation and a change in domestic factor prices. A subsequent section will then take a general equilibrium perspective on this adjustment process, allowing such 'globalization shocks' to affect more than one industry at a time.
Disturbance of the integrated production equilibrium
To be more concrete, we assume that the costs of disintegration are specific to fragments. 18 g i now is a vector representation of fragmentation costs in industry i, g f i ( f 5 1,y, F ). Suppose that with initial costs equal to g i0 a subset G i of fragments is produced domestically, while the complementary set H i is produced abroad. Using a subscript 0 to indicate this initial equilibrium we have, for an arbitrary fragment f:
where s f i is defined as in (16) above, explicitly pointing out the role played by the cost of international fragmentation. Since we assume constant foreign factor prices throughout, we abstain from indexing w Ã . It should be noted that, with costly outsourcing, effective prices also depend on the cost of 18. Fragment-specific costs allow us to more easily pin down the magnitude of the disturbance in that a change in g g i does not change the cost of procuring fragments other than fragment g.
Notice again the unit convention implying q f i0 ¼ 1 for all f. Suppose that, due to globalization, the margin of fragmentation rotates, say from a position like A to a position like B in Figure 2 , and that it crosses the vector b g i ðwÞ for some fragment gAG i . 19 In other words, for initial costs of fragmentation g g i0 , savings from outsourcing were negative and with g g i1 og g i0 we observe s g i 40. It is easy to see that this implies a violation of the zeroprofit condition for industry i:
Condition (19) states that foreign production of fragment gAG i was a lossmaking activity at the initial cost of fragmentation and, therefore, did not take place. Equation (21) states that it now generates a positive profit. The unit cost of producing fragment g abroad, including the cost of locational disintegration, is lower than the value imputed to that fragment in the initial equilibrium. This generates an incentive for further fragmentation. Moreover, for a zero-profit equilibrium to be restored, there has to be some adjustment in factor prices. Before we turn to the question of what, precisely, this adjustment may look like, we investigate the magnitude of the disturbance as such. Intuitively, it depends on the remaining cost of fragmentation after the globalization shock, on the productivity difference between the two economies, and on factor price differences in conjunction with the factor intensity pattern in fragment g. This is substantiated in precise terms in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 (cost savings from fragmentation). Suppose that in some industry i a 'globalization-shock' turns s g i ðw 0 ; w Ã ; g g i Þ from negative to positive, with certain levels of the costs of disintegration and Ricardian technology gaps, g g i1 and t i , respectively. Suppose that in relative terms the initial factor price difference for factor m is given byŵ w m0 ¼ w Ã m =w m0 À 1, and represented in vector form byŵ w 0 . Then, if technology is of the Leontief type, at initial factor prices there is a disturbance of the zero-profit equilibrium in industry i, the magnitude of which -relative to the initial domestic cost of producing fragment g -is
19. In our modeling framework, the exogenous forces determining the margin are g i and t i . Of course, the margin also changes if there is a change in factor prices, brought about, say, through changing prices of final goods p i . However, our purpose here is to explore implications of an increased international disintegration of production on factor prices at constant final goods prices. Hence, we must treat g i and t i as exogenous, and factor prices as endogenous variables. where y g i is a vector representation of the usual factor shares for fragment g. For a technology which allows for factor substitution, s g i is increased by a further additive term.
The proof is completed in the Appendix, but the intuition is quite straightforward. The costs of fragmentation and the technology gaps drive the magnitude of the disturbance in a completely symmetric way. If factors in the foreign economy are less productive, then g g i t i 41, and the first term in (22) is negative. For s g i to be positive, this needs to be offset by a Heckscher-Ohlin-type advantage arising from the interaction between factor price differences and factor intensities, as represented by the second term in (22).
Possible adjustments
With an incentive for further international fragmentation due to some lower g g i , some factor prices must increase, reflecting the benefit of an improved technology. In general, such an increase may take place abroad or at home, or in both economies. A full treatment of this question would require a model where foreign factor prices are endogenous. In this paper, we look at the small-economy case where foreign factor prices are constant. But even in this simpler case, much can happen. In particular, domestic factors may gain quite disproportionately. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that some factors suffer a real income loss. Simple reference to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem does not suffice to establish this case, however. Lower g's imply some form of lower cost at unchanged commodity prices, while the Stolper-Samuelson theorem rests on goods price changes at unchanged technology. Moreover, if lower g's lead to outsourcing, then there is a potentially dramatic change in the technology used to generate domestic value-added, which precludes a direct application of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Nevertheless, using our concept of effective prices for fragments, we may analyze outsourcing scenarios such that the fundamental logic of the Stolper-Samuelson theorem helps us to identify their distributional consequences. What we need to do is find out how fragmentation changes effective fragment prices, and to map these changes into factor price changes. Unfortunately, this cannot be done without further assumptions. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem rests on the assumption that each good is produced with a well-defined pattern of factor inputs which follows from cost minimization and depends only on factor prices. The following definition captures this basic notion.
Definition 2 (Stolper-Samuelson-type disturbance). A Stolper-Samuelson disturbance is defined as any change in the economic environment which alters the market value of a single activity with a well-defined and unique pattern of primary factor inputs per unit of this activity, whereby these inputs depend only on prevailing factor prices.
From (19) and (20) plus the underlying definitions of effective prices and the zero-profit condition, the initial equilibrium must satisfy
This may appear puzzling at first sight. One expects, for instance, that a lower final goods price p i , or a lower productivity level, should be reflected in a lower level of effective prices, while (23) states that effective prices always lie on a 'unit-plane'. The puzzle is easily resolved by observing the unit convention behind effective prices in Definition 1 above. Specifically, lower effective prices for given 'natural' units of fragments show up as a change in units considered, with effective prices now relating to larger quantities of fragments. With constant foreign factor prices, we may rewrite (23) as:
noting again that q f i0 ¼ 1. For easier notation, we writẽ
for the total factor cost of obtaining 'foreign fragments' as required per unit value of the final good in the initial equilibrium.
To proceed with the analysis, we introduce a further definition of prices. For those fragments initially produced at home (f 2 G i ), we define p p f i as the input prices 'mandated' byH H i , irrespective of whether they satisfy the zeroprofit condition (19) for domestic production. These prices must satisfy X
Alternative points on the plane described by (25) represent hypothetical prices for fragments (for f 2 G i ) which would, if available on markets, allow firms to secure the initial input levels (q f i0 ¼ 1) at the same total cost as they incur for internal production. In the initial equilibrium, this is equal to what is left from a dollar's worth of revenue, after paying the cost of fragments already outsourced to the foreign economy. Figure 3 assumes that prior to the globalization scenario the number of fragments in G i is equal to 2. The initial equilibrium fp 1 i0 ; p 2 i0 g must obviously lie on the straight line described by (25) . Other points on this line would facilitate the same input cost if fragments became available at the respective prices. However, if all fragments in G i are to be produced domestically, then other points on this line would, in general, require domestic factor prices different from w 0 . 20 This is necessarily true if the number of factors is equal to, or larger than, the number of fragments in G i , and if fragments have different factor intensities. In this case, the equilibrium factor price vector w 0 uniquely determines the effective prices consistent with zero profits in domestic production of fragments f 2 G i . If the number of factors is smaller than the number of fragments in G i , then equilibrium factor prices w 0 would allow for some degree of freedom as regards effective prices of fragments in G i , but except for a coincidence the set of effective prices consistent with w 0 would not lie on the line (25). 21 I now assume that technology features functional separability in the sense that the two components 1 and 2 can be aggregated to a composite input G according to a concave aggregator q G i ðq 1 i ; q 2 i Þ. 22 Then there exists a dual cost function c G i ð p p 1 i ; p p 2 i ; q G i Þ which is concave in prices p p. Given q f i0 ¼ 1, the initial level of this composite input is equal to q G i ð1; 1Þ. The initial equilibrium point fp 1 i0 ; p 2 i0 g must lie on the 'fragment price frontier' defined by
Suppose now that fragments do become available at prices different from their initial equilibrium levels fp 1 i0 ; p 2 i0 g. After all, this is what outsourcing is all about. Different input prices for fragments in general imply that q 1 i ¼ 1 and
is optimal, then the fragment price frontier (26) must be tangent to the line (25) at the equilibrium point fp 1 i0 ; p 2 i0 g, implying that Shephard's lemma indeed leads to
. If fragment 2 is outsourced, with a savings effect as described by Theorem 2, then the input price for this fragment is reduced by s 2 i in proportional terms, and by s 2 i Âp 2 i0 in absolute terms. If foreign factor prices remain constant, and if the aggregator q G i ðq 1 i ; q 2 i Þ is of the Leontief type, then the fragment price frontier (26) coincides with the line (25), and the ensuing adjustment must entail a relative change in the effective price of fragment 1 equal to s 2 i Âp 2 i0 =p 1 i0 . If technology allows for substitution between fragments, then the fragment price frontier is strictly convex, and the 'mandated' increase of the effective price of fragment 1 exceeds s 2 i Âp 2 i0 , moving to point P 1 in Figure 3 . Of course, this does not complete the adjustment story, even from a partial equilibrium point of view. First, in Figure 3 the steeper slope of the fragment price frontier at P 1 shows that 20. Notice the difference between prices p p f i and effective prices according to Definition 1 above. Equation (25) only looks at the 'upper-level' technology of assembling fragments to final goods, whereas Definition 1 is also concerned with the production of fragments on the 'lower level' of technology. 21. To see this, take the simplest case with only one factor and two fragments. If the input coefficients for the two fragments are different, then the fragment price-line consistent with zero profits has a slope different from one and, therefore, does not coincide with the straight line (25). 22. On this form of separability, see Varian (1992, pp. 150-152). adjustment involves a substitution away from fragment 1. Second, the higher effective price of fragment 1 implied by this adjustment must also be supported by factor prices different from w 0 . In other words, a higher 'mandated' effective price for domestic fragment 1 in turn 'mandates' higher domestic factor prices.
The vertical distance between points P 0 and P 1 is a measure of the overall domestic factor price increase that is 'mandated' by outsourcing fragment 2. We shall henceforth call this the 'industry gain from outsourcing', and we use s 1 i to indicate this gain relative to the initial effective price of fragment 1 (which remains domestic). As far as industry i is concerned, the precise distribution of this gain across different factor owners is indeterminate, unless there is only one factor. A proportional increase in all factor rewards equal to the industry gain is a possible, but not the only outcome. The distributional effect of outsourcing can only be determined by general equilibrium considerations to which we shall turn in the next section.
If the industry gain relates to a single remaining fragment as in Figure 3 , then by definition it constitutes a Stolper-Samuelson-type disturbance. In other words, the change from p 1 i0 to p 1 i0 ð1 þ s 1 i Þ affects the imputed market value of an activity with a well-defined pattern of factor inputs in the sense of Definition 2. In order to generalize this result to the case where more than one component of the value-added chain remains in the domestic economy, we need to extend the separability assumption. If functional separability gives rise to an effective fragment price frontier for all fragments in G i , and if the fragments remaining in the post-outsourcing domestic value-added chain are in the same sense separable from the 'marginal' component g which is outsourced, then the generalization is straightforward. We shall henceforth call this composite activity residual value-added and indicate it with G G. 23 A perfectly analogous generalization is possible with Hicksian aggregation instead of functional separability. This case arises if all fragments of the residual domestic value-added chain have constant relative effective prices. 24 The different fragments of domestic value-added will then be used in constant proportions which, in turn, implies that the value-added process as a whole is characterized by a unique pattern of primary factor inputs depending on factor prices. The above line of argument thus leads to the following theorem. 23. To avoid cluttered notation, we abstain from indexing G G although this set will be different across industries, as is the specific fragment g affected by outsourcing. 24. This raises an issue of interpretation which I cannot address here. A possible interpretation is that there are perfect markets for fragments f 2 G G i where industry i firms are of negligible importance. (1) foreign factor prices w Ã are constant;
(2) the fragments in G i are functionally separable from those in H i ; and if (3) the fragments that remain in the domestic value-added chain constitute an integrated economic activity in the sense of functional separability, or by virtue of constant relative effective fragment prices.
In proportional terms, the market value of this residual domestic valueadded, indicated by
, respectively, are initial equilibrium effective prices for activities g and G G in industry i value-added. In turn, s G G i is an overall measure of the extent to which the gain in industry i from outsourcing 'mandates' an increase in domestic factor prices.
With a given savings effect for fragment g, the magnitude of the industry gain s G G i is driven by the ratio of effective prices p g i0 =p G G i0 , which is equal to the initial cost of fragment g relative to the total cost of the residual domestic valueadded chain. A small share of residual value-added relative to the fragment which is outsourced thus acts like a leverage for the magnitude of the Stolper-Samuelson disturbance.
HIGHER FRAGMENTATION IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
From a partial equilibrium perspective, the distribution of the industry gain s G G i across factors is indeterminate. To identify distributional effects of outsourcing, this section looks at the whole economy in general equilibrium, allowing fragmentation to take place simultaneously in several industries and assuming that in each industry it gives rise to a Stolper-Samuelson-type disturbance as described in the previous section. We first ask whether some factors will lose from fragmentation, and then derive a general result on its distributional consequences.
We retain the assumption of an arbitrary number of factors with perfect intersectoral mobility. If the industry gain from outsourcing reflects an increase in the value of an activity with a well-defined factor input pattern which depends on domestic factor prices, then factor price changes have a well-defined effect on the cost of this activity. If it is to remain viable, then factor price changes must be such that the implied cost effect is equal to the industry gain s G G i . The same must hold for all activities in the economy. To determine factor price changes, we need to broaden our perspective to include factor market clearing.
Real income loss for some factors
The general line of reasoning is best understood by looking at Figure 4 which refers to Figures 1 and 2 above in assuming that the initial equilibrium features domestic specialization on industries 2 and 3, without any fragmentation. We now assume that this equilibrium is disturbed by lower g 1 2 . The unit-value isoquants for final goods 2 and 3 (solid lines) are tangent to the initial factor price line w 0 , with associated input bundles a 30 and a 20 . So are the industry 2 isoquants corresponding to the unit-value levels of fragment 1 (with input bundle b 1 20 ) and the composite activity G G (with input bundle b G G 20 ), given their initial effective prices p 1 20 and p G G 20 . The assumption thus is that a shift in the margin of fragmentation leads to outsourcing of fragment 1 in industry 2. Notice that, by definition, the vector addition of b 1 20 and b G G 20 leads to the same factor intensity as a 20 , albeit to a larger input bundle.
The preceding analysis suggests that we can identify the factor price effects by shifting the unit-value isoquant for the residual value-added activity G G towards the origin by a proportional distance equal to s G G 2 , such that p G G size of s G G 2 is determined as described in Theorem 2 above. Integrated production of good 2 is no longer viable domestically, nor is fragment 1 of industry 2. The remaining part of the value-added chain (activity G G) remains viable, with factor bundle b G G 21 , and so does industry 3, with factor bundle a 31 . The new equilibrium factor price line w 1 is tangent to isoquants 1=p G G 21 and 1/p 3 . Capital suffers an income loss, while labor gains. With constant final goods these are also real income changes.
It is fairly obvious, however, that this case does not establish a general result. Assume, for instance, that the residual factor intensity ray b G G 20 lies to the south-east of a 30 (not depicted, to avoid clutter). In that case international fragmentation still affects the labor-intensive industry, but it increases the imputed value of an activity which is relatively capital intensive. The same logic then leads to a real income loss (gain) for labor (capital). But notice that this is consistent with a full-employment equilibrium only if the domestic endowment ray similarly lies to the south-east of a 30 , such as V 0 instead of V. Indeed, it can be shown using Figure 4 that the two cases are mutually exclusive. Factor endowments determine which case is ruled out. Based on Figure 4 , we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (real income loss). If outsourcing is driven by factor intensity differences across fragments (as described by Theorem 2), and if it takes place only in industry i, then, with given domestic endowments and perfect flexibility of factor prices, some factors will necessarily suffer a real income loss, unless the residual factor intensity b The proof is straightforward. Full employment requires that V lies in a cone spanned by the factor-input rays of all viable activities. In Figure 4 , the relevant cone prior to outsourcing is spanned by a 20 and a 30 , and with international fragmentation it is spanned by b G G 21 and a 31 , respectively. If b G G i0 6 ¼ eV, then full employment requires that some other activity remains viable, in addition to the residual value-added chain of industry 2. Given constant final goods prices, this in turn requires constant unit cost for some other activity which, by construction of our argument, does not itself benefit from outsourcing. Thus, the familiar Stolper-Samuelson logic applies: the industry gain s G G i requires that some factor prices increase (labor in Figure 4 ), while the viability constraint on some other activity requires that at least one factor price declines (capital rental in Figure 4 ). 25 With constant final goods prices, these are also real income changes. 25 . In Figure 4, a 
Distributional consequences
Theorem 4 is obviously an extreme case, but it is a useful step towards a more general result on distributional consequences of fragmentation. Suppose that a 'globalization shock' affects several industries in the way described above, leading to a certain intersectoral pattern of gains s G G i . The technology pertaining to the residual value-added chains in each industry is captured by factor input bundles a G G i ðwÞ or, equivalently, by the unit-value levels of these bundles which are defined as in (11). Remember again our scaling assumption, implying q f i0 ¼ 1 for all goods and fragments. Hence, a G G
0 Þ where a tilde indicates inputs per unit of a fragment. Invoking the separability assumption underlying Theorem 3, we useã a G G i ðwÞ to denote the cost-minimizing input bundle per unit of the aggregate residual activity G G. Without loss of generality, we may also scale units such that a a G G i ðwÞ ¼ a G G i ðw 0 Þ. We now introduce factor market clearing by means of the dual GNP function. 26 Owing to international fragmentation, however, this function appears in a slightly complicated form:
Allowing for international disintegration of production, the minimum cost functions in (27) need to be replaced by appropriate expressions pertaining to individual fragments, duly taking into account foreign factor prices w Ã , which in this case become a further determinant of domestic GNP, as do the costs of international fragmentation g. 27 Thus, in the initial equilibrium factor prices w 0 satisfy the inequality constraint postulated by (27) in the specific form of expressions (19) and (20) above, with g i 5 g i0 . These conditions state that the minimum cost of each fragment, wherever it is produced, is equal to its imputed market value, with the inequalities ruling out further cost reductions by relocating production of individual fragments. At this stage it becomes relevant whether the real factor use behind g is domestic or foreign. We assume it is foreign. However, this is not a crucial element for the result to be derived below.
As above, we assume that the 'globalization shock' affects a single fragment. Without loss of generality, we call it fragment g for each industry. In the initial equilibrium, a condition analogous to (19) also holds for the composite residual activity G G in each industry i which is active in the domestic economy. Denoting the imputed value of that residual activity by 26. See Dixit and Norman (1980, pp. 44ff .) for a more detailed treatment of the dual GNP function. 27. g must now be thought of as a matrix representation of industry-specific fragmentation costs g i which are, in turn, vector representations of g f i . 
Lower costs of fragmentation now change these market values, leading to Stolper-Samuelson-type disturbances in several industries. Indicating the new equilibrium GNP by Y 1 , we have
The new factor prices w 1 must satisfy the minimization conditions corresponding to (29) . The challenge now is to describe the difference between w 1 and w 0 in a general and interesting manner. The industry gain s G G i is a summary measure of the factor price increase 'mandated' the cost savings from outsourcing in industry i. This gain will in general vary across industries. We denote the industry where the gain is at least as large as in all the others by i 0 . We shall henceforth call industry i 0 the 'leading' industry.
For benchmark purposes, we define a notional factor price vector
Factor prices w 0 1 would prevail in the new equilibrium if all industries were to enjoy industry gains equal to s G G i 0 . Since unit-input demands are homogeneous of degree zero, and given equation (28), factor prices w 0 1 satisfy the constraint in (29). Hence, by definition of the GNP function in (29), we have
with a strict inequality if industry gains are different, and if more than one industry remains viable. This may be rewritten as
where j m1 5 (w m1 V m )/Y 1 , i.e. the share of factor m in post-outsourcing GNP, and accordingly for j m0 . The second inequality follows from the simple adding-up property of j m1 , i.e. P M m¼1 j m1 ¼ 1. The term Y 0 ð1 þ s G G i 0 Þ=Y 1 may be interpreted as a scaling factor representing the benchmark case of equal industry gains s G G i 0 . Notice that in this special case Y 1 ¼ Y 0 ð1 þ s G G i 0 Þ, hence (32) holds with equality and income shares do not change. In the more general case, inequality (32) mirrors the fact that an equal percentage increase of all factor remunerations by the maximum industry gain s G G i 0 is beyond what outsourcing offers in terms of economy-wide cost savings.
in the second part of (33). At the same time, since the cost ofb b G G i 0 ðw 0 Þ was equal to one at initial factor prices w 0 , using the bundleb b G G i 0 ðw 1 Þ would have generated a cost in excess of one. We therefore have
Combining the equation in (33) with the inequality in (34), we have
Multiplying this by 1 þ s G G i 0 clearly preserves the inequality, such that
Combining this with inequality (31), where we may expand each term by w m0 /w m0 and divide by Y 0 , we arrive at Theorem 5.
Theorem 5 (distributional impact of outsourcing). If globalization leads to simultaneous shifts in the margins of fragmentation for several industries, and if there is a 'leading' industry i 0 where the resulting Stolper-Samuelson disturbance for the residual domestic value-added chain, s G G i 0 , is at least as large as in any other industry, then the distributional impact of such a shift is related to the factor-intensity characteristics of the resulting process of outsourcing in the following way:
Given that P M m¼1 y m ¼ 0, as noted above, we may note that the basic result can also be expressed by stating that the correlation coefficient between the two variables o m and y m across factors is positive.
Interpretation
The general message conveyed by Theorem 5 is that the distributional consequences of international fragmentation are not at all determined by the factor-intensity pattern of the fragments that are outsourced to the foreign economy. Instead, it is the factor intensity of the remaining domestic activities that matter. Which activities remain viable domestically, in turn, depends on the intersectoral pattern of the Stolper-Samuelson disturbances that arise in the process of outsourcing. It is, of course, conceivable that activities become non-viable at new factor prices, even though they are not directly hit by the 'globalization shock'. Indeed, with many industries and only two primary factors such extreme specialization effects are almost inevitable. This is a well-known property of Heckscher-Ohlin models which reappears in this context. Generally, the smaller the discrepancy between the number of final goods (or industries) and primary factors, the less likely are such extreme specialization effects; see Ethier (1984) .
The margin of fragmentation may cut into the domestic value-added chain, not only through a fall in the cost fragmentation, but also through the factor-price effect stemming from Stolper-Samuelson disturbances in other industries. This case is fully covered by the above result. The crucial point is that the inequality constraint in (29) may be used, a fortiori, for those activities that become non-viable through the factor-price change from w 0 to w 1 . The same does not hold true, however, for activities which were nonviable at initial factor prices and become viable at w 1 . In theory, this case may even arise in such a way that individual fragments re-enter the domestic value-added chain.
It should be interesting to see if special cases discussed in the previous literature can be reconstructed from Theorem 5 under appropriate assumptions. This can be done, for instance, for the seemingly contradictory results emphasized by Arndt (1997 Arndt ( , 1999 and Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) . Both are special in different ways and can be stated as corollaries of Theorem 5.
Corollary 1. Assume that there are only two industries and factors (for instance, capital K and labor L, say) and that outsourcing only takes place in the labor-intensive industry. If both industries remain viable, then it will be true that y L 40 and y K o0, and hence that o L 40 and o K 40. This is the case stressed by Arndt. The inequalities y L 40 and y K o0 follow from the requirement that the two activities must span a cone containing the endowment point.
Corollary 2.
If there is only one industry drawing on many fragments with differing factor intensities (say, skilled labor S relative to unskilled labor U ), and if for some reason it is always the most skill-intensive fragment that is outsourced to the foreign economy, then it will always be true that y S 40 and y U o0, and hence that o S 40 and o U 40. This is the case emerging in Feenstra and Hanson. The reason for y S 40 and y U o0 is as with the previous corollary.
Corollaries 1 and 2 involve cases which are especially interesting to look at since they use Theorem 5 for a reconstruction of results that have been discussed in previous literature and which seem contradictory at first sight. Other cases for which this could be done are found in Jones (2000) and Jones and Kierzkowski (2001b) , but available space does not permit any further discussion in this paper. 
CONCLUSION
Instead of reiterating results, I conclude the paper with suggestions for further research. There are obvious and less obvious avenues. The assumption of given world prices for final goods is an obvious candidate for relaxation. The analysis in this paper has looked at outsourcing from a single-country perspective, assuming constant prices in foreign factor markets that outsourcing draws upon. If international fragmentation is seen as a large-scale and worldwide reorganization of vertical production structures, then it is likely to change equilibrium world prices for final goods and thus factor prices in all countries. Scenarios of this kind can only be addressed with the aid of a model where world prices are endogenous.
However, even for cases where world prices of final goods are exogenous and constant, assuming constant foreign factor prices may be unwarranted for specific scenarios of outsourcing. Assuming constant foreign factor prices implies that outsourcing introduces a new productive activity into the foreign economy with an imputed value equal to its factor cost at the prices prevailing in foreign factor markets. All cost savings that arise from a more efficient geographical restructuring of production are imputed to higher effective prices of residual domestic value-added chains. This is a reasonable assumption if domestic firms have some form of ownership advantage, and if the residual domestic value-added is a 'downstream' activity which needs to be carried out in the domestic economy, say because of some national advantage, such as a specific form of infrastructure.
In some cases, however, conditions may be such that the fragment broken off for foreign production achieves an imputed value which is equal to its former cost of production at factor prices prevailing in the domestic economy. Then, the activity which newly emerges in the foreign economy has an effective (or imputed) price in excess of its foreign factor cost, and equilibrium adjustment requires some foreign factor price change. This can be determined, in principle, along lines similar to the above analysis. Further research should specify the precise conditions under which either of these cases is likely to arise.
These conditions most likely also relate to the costs that arise if production is fragmented across national borders. The analysis in this paper has deliberately chosen a somewhat rudimentary treatment of these costs, so as to allow a sharp focus in the channels relevant for factor price changes. A richer model structure would allow for asymmetries between fragments as regards the cost involved if production is disintegrated. In a similar vein, introducing an explicit 'upstream-downstream' dimension into the underlying technology of fragmentation would help to generate sharper results.
A final point relates to the assumption of perfect competition and -related to this -the complete absence of any element of fixed costs. Imperfect competition may be relevant on goods markets and, maybe more interestingly, on labor markets which are often the key concern in connection with outsourcing. 28 In turn, fixed costs may be relevant in production proper, or in bridging locational and cultural differences if production takes place under international fragmentation.
It is to be expected that the framework of analysis presented in this paper forms a useful ground for exploring several of these avenues for further research. A key message from this framework is that the consequences of international fragmentation are best understood as arising from changes in effective prices for fragments of the value-added chain. These vary across industries and the general equilibrium effects of outsourcing depends on the sectoral pattern of these changes, and on the technological details of the marginal fragments affected in each industry. The above analysis has opened up ways to pin down the relevant properties in terms of general statements which should prove useful for further research.
APPENDIX. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We first recognize (21), and then decompose the cost savings achieved by disintegrating fragment g from domestic value-added at notionally unchanged factor prices. From (16), we have s g i ðw 0 ; w Ã ; g g i1 Þ ¼ w T 0 a g i ðw 0 Þ À g g i1 w ÃT a gÃ i ðw Ã Þ ð 37Þ
This can be decomposed as follows:
s g i ðw 0 ; w Ã ; g g i1 Þ ¼ ð1 À g g i1 t i Þw T 0 a g i ðw 0 Þ þ g g i1 ½t i w T 0 a g i ðw 0 Þ À w ÃT a gÃ i ðw Ã Þ ¼ ð1 À g g i1 t i Þw T 0 a g i ðw 0 Þ þ g g i1 t i ðw 0 À w Ã Þ T a g i ðw 0 Þ þ g g i1 ½t i w ÃT a g i ðw 0 Þ À w ÃT a gÃ i ðw Ã Þ ð38Þ
Notice that s g i 40 implies that the margin of fragmentation in Theorem 1 has crossed b g i such that ðw À g g i0 t i w Ã Þ T b g i ðwÞ40. Defining s g i ¼ s g i =½w T a g i ðw 0 Þ, we have
where y g i and y gÃ i are vector representations of the usual factor shares for fragment g. Specifically, for factor m we have y g im ¼ ½w m0 a g im ðw 0 Þ=½w T 0 a g i ðw 0 Þ, and analogously for y gÃ im . Moreover,ŵ w 0 is a vector of factor price differences between the foreign and domestic economy, expressed in relative terms, such that for factor m,ŵ w m0 ¼ w Ã m0 =w m0 À 1. And finally, the termâ a 0 i measures the efficiency-corrected difference in inputs between the two locations of production, withâ a g im ¼ ½t i a g im ðw 0 Þ=½a gÃ im ðw Ã Þ À 1. If technology of fragment g 28. See, for instance, Skaksen (2001) where outsourcing takes place under a unionized labor market. is of the Leontief type, featuring fixed input coefficients for all factors, we haveâ a g im ¼ 0, which leads to Theorem 2. For a technology allowing for factor substitution, the final term in this equation is always positive by virtue of cost minimization.
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